

**A Basic Goods Approach to International Corporate Responsibility:  
The Case of Hiring in Developing Nations**

by  
Sheldon Wein

Department of Philosophy  
Saint Mary's University  
Halifax, Nova Scotia, CANADA, B3H 3C3  
[sheldonwein@stmarys.ca](mailto:sheldonwein@stmarys.ca)

## **Introduction**

Consider the following problem. A multinational corporation is expanding its operations to a developing country. The developing country in question is now a democracy or is in the process of becoming one, it has a (fairly) independent and corruption-free judiciary (or is in the process of establishing one), its human rights record, while not perfect, is improving, and its bureaucracy and police are not now terribly corrupt. But not too long ago, none of these things were true. A few years back, the nation was run by a dictator, and the bureaucracy, judiciary, and police were all corrupt. Business people, and everyone else, had to operate within this corrupt system, and for business people this usually involved—at a minimum—lending tacit support to the existing regime, paying bribes, making financial “donations” to the ruling party, overlooking various “activities”, and so forth.

Any reasonable assessment of the facts tells one that there is a high probability that anyone who lived and worked in that nation during the period of the dictatorship certainly knew about at least some of the nefarious activities of the regime and participated in them, at least passively. The more successful an individual was during this period, the more likely this was true. Put bluntly, most of the people in the country who now have managerial experience are likely to be at least somewhat tainted by the activities that took place during the dictatorship. Of course, the majority of such people were not evil-doers directly. Other things being equal, they would have preferred that the dictatorship not have existed and that their business activities could have taken place in a less unwholesome environment. It was their bad luck to have been born in the place they

were at the time they were. And, short of truly heroic sacrifice, there was little they could do to keep from getting their hands somewhat dirty.<sup>1</sup>

The following question then arises: Who should determine what are the appropriate standards for hiring new personnel in such circumstances? For the purpose of this paper, I will refer to this problem as the hiring problem. Our question is whether the hiring problem is one solely of business ethics or whether it should be thought of as a matter for community or social decision-making.

In this paper, I argue that the basic goods approach to international justice offers at least as good a method for sorting through the issues raised by this type of case as does any of the leading alternatives. I begin by rehearsing the standard arguments for thinking that we should not expect a direct derivation from the value we designate as a metric for progress in international development contexts to cases such as this one.<sup>2</sup> I then go on to suggest what I take to be a neutral account of how to go from general accounts of value to principles or rules governing more particular cases.<sup>3</sup> I then argue that the issue of what rights and duties should be recognized by both employers and potential employees has the same *logical structure* as the problem regarding how duties to aid should be weighed

---

<sup>1</sup> This paper does not address those individuals who actually were directly involved in serious wrongdoing. They are already covered by international law. Here we are concerned with those whose activities did not rise to such levels (or, perhaps I should say, whose activities did not sink to such levels).

<sup>2</sup> This avoids begging any questions against the utilitarian approach to such issues, which has, in my opinion, long been unfairly tarred with this brush.

<sup>3</sup> No account can be completely neutral here, since in many cases—think of Rawls's uses for primary goods—the choice of a value to be used is determined by the requirements of the theory in which it is to be used. And, of course, the adoption of some devices for assisting in ethical reasoning seems to favor those outcomes which would be supported by certain theories. (For example, if one uses an impartial spectator to make one's moral derivations, the outcomes are going to co-vary with those derived by some form of utilitarianism.)

against duties to rescue.<sup>4</sup> This may not seem like progress, for sorting out the differences between duties to aid and duties to rescue is notoriously difficult. But I argue that a close examination of this difficult ethical problem will illuminate the hiring problem.<sup>5</sup> I then sketch the basic goods account and compare it with its competitors: recognized human rights, utility, well-being, capabilities for functioning, global public goods, primary goods, Dworkinian resources, and basic needs. General theoretical reasons for the basic goods account are briefly sketched. After this, I turn to the task of showing that the basic goods account might do a better job in this sort of case than any of the alternatives.<sup>6</sup> Finally, as the proof in such matters is always in the pudding, I go on to outline how the basic goods account would deal with the issue at hand, showing both that it offers a viable solution, given the information that can be expected to be available in such circumstances, and that such an account coheres well with other accounts of how to deal with hard cases when international business ethics confronts the unexpected circumstances raised by developing societies.

### **Ethical Reasoning**

It would be a mistake to handle this (and almost all other ethical problems) by simply asking what it is that is really of value and then, having answered this question,

---

<sup>4</sup> Note that I do not claim that corporations have either a duty to aid or a duty to rescue, nor do I deny this. The paper is agnostic on this matter.

<sup>5</sup> I claim only that the present problem—the hiring problem—has the same logical structure as the problem concerning how personal duties to rescue individuals in immediate threat of grave danger are to be compared with the personal duty to provide aid to the very needy. These are two different duties and, I claim, the distinction between them illuminates the hiring problem. I make no claims about the weight of such duties.

<sup>6</sup> Obviously, in the space available I cannot make careful comparisons with how all these options might best be seen as dealing with the problem. I merely sketch how the basic goods approach deals with the issue and leave it to the reader to decide whether this is a better route than offered by any of the alternatives.

asking what action or rule would best serve to maximize or promote this value. Ethical reasoning is never—or almost never—this simple. (And for this we can be thankful. The cases where it is this simple are typically ones involving the threat of massive disaster).<sup>7</sup> Rather, we must do several things when dealing with such issues. First, we must be sure that we understand the nature of the issue. Second, we must be sure that the values we propose to use when dealing with problems of this nature are, in Amartya Sen’s useful term, ones which have an appropriate “informational basis”.<sup>8</sup> We must then, at the critical level of moral reasoning, begin the task of asking what rules and principles we want to apply at the intuitive level.<sup>9</sup> Here we have to be careful to be appropriately constrained by the facts while also recognizing that facts can themselves be changed.<sup>10</sup> We must also recognize that the kind of problem we are dealing with involves not just conflicts of values but issues of national pride (and shame), as well as those of professional business standards. Furthermore, there is almost always a danger that moralistic solutions may pose harms to economic progress.<sup>11</sup> Any acceptable solution to our problem must take all these factors into account.

---

<sup>7</sup> Robert Nozick resorted to an ad hoc exception for catastrophic moral circumstances in order to make his rights-based theory, advanced in *Anarchy State and Utopia*, plausible.

<sup>8</sup> (Sen 1999). It is my view that we need values that have both the appropriate informational basis and the appropriate motivational basis. But to claim this at this point in the argument would be to give the basic goods approach an unfair advantage.

<sup>9</sup> The terms “critical level” and “intuitive level” are R. M. Hare’s (Hare 1981). It is important to remember that every moral *theory* (even intuitionism) employs something like this distinction, for without some such distinction we could not intelligibly ask questions about the wisdom of recognizing a set of rights and duties or the aptness of our existing moral attitudes.

<sup>10</sup> It is unfortunately standard practice for moral theorists to try to respect the so-called “ought-implies-can” restriction on moral requirements according to which no theory can generate duties which people (literally) cannot fulfill, for this would serve only to put morality into disrepute. But this understanding is overly restrictive. (See Gibbard, pages 303-309).

<sup>11</sup> And there are issues surrounding globalization. Some people favor globalization not only on economic but also on moral grounds, arguing that, even if we discount economic growth globalization could bring to most developing societies, features such as transparency, ethical business practices, and support for the rule of law (all of which transnational firms tend to favor)

Since all these features tend to make matters rather messy, I propose to begin by examining two related duties: the duty to come to assistance of those who need some form of rescue, and the duty to provide aid to those who need urgent help. (I will call the first the duty to rescue, and the second the duty to aid.) I will argue that the basic goods approach is superior to other methods of understanding the relationship between these two duties mainly because it serves to illuminate the distinction between them in a helpful way. In particular, it shows why, though there may be as much reason to provide charitable aid to the needy as there is to come to the rescue of those in distress, the motive for the latter is (both in fact and quite properly) more compelling than the motive for the former. The basic goods approach does a better job than any of the leading alternatives in showing why this is so. I will then return to the present problem and show how the basic goods solution to conflicts between duties to rescue and duties to aid can be modified to deal with the ethical issues encountered in the hiring problems outlined above.

### **Metrics for ethical decisions**

---

will be good for the people living in developing societies. They hold that such benefits would accrue to the developing societies even if they did not bring with them any economic advances. Opponents usually hold that, aside from the serious economic disruptions globalization can bring, it undermines traditional values, leaving the developing society without the fiber to resist the corporate view of everything or to deal adequately with whatever displacements rapid change brings. Of course, those who see globalization as a good thing usually think it brings both better moral values and increased wealth, while those who oppose it tend to hold that it both destroys the economy and undermines traditional values which they judge to be most apt for developing societies. But one might hold that (in some cases, at least) globalization will lead to economic growth at the cost of moral values or that globalization has net economic costs but net moral benefits. All four positions are logically possible and may even be the best descriptions of various societies at various stages of development and integration into the global economy. Of course, which facts are relevant to determining which society is in which situation is far beyond the scope of the present essay.

Whether one thinks that, as a matter of justice, items of value should be maximized, or distributed equally, or distributed according to merit, or allocated by some other standard, the following question inevitably arises: *what* is it that should be maximized, or distributed equally, or distributed according to merit, or distributed by whatever standard one's preferred theory of justice recommends? What is the thing we are to use in determining whether the current state of affairs distributes things justly or unjustly? Or, put another way, what are we to use when measuring whether a change in states of affairs is an improvement with respect to justice?<sup>12</sup>

The principle candidates for these roles are the following. (In each case I have provided a reference to a leading advocate for, or statement of, the view.)

**Basic Goods:** Things which one would be willing to have imposed upon oneself (or one's society) and which it is rational to want in those one is going to be interacting with (Wein forthcoming).

**Basic Needs:** Those things minimally necessary to sustain human life (Braybrooke).

**Capabilities:** Those things that enable a person to function as a normal human being and hence are essential for human flourishing (Aristotle, Nussbaum, and Sen 1989).

**Global Public Goods:** Collective consumption goods or things of which consumption is non-rivalrous and non-exclusionary and of which these properties extend across widely dispersed (both spatially and temporally) people or countries (Kaul *et al.*).

**Human Rights:** Moral rights which individuals hold simply in virtue of being the sorts of entities that can be both sapient and sentient (e.g., Wein 1999).

---

<sup>12</sup> The range I will select here will be broader than that used by Amartya Sen in his famous paper "Equality of What?" (in Sen 1982), but the approach is the same.

**Primary Goods:** Those things it is rational to want no matter what more-specific things one happens to want (Rawls).<sup>13</sup>

**Resources:** Those things which people value, measured by how much others would sacrifice in terms of what they value in order to have them (Dworkin 2000).

**Utility:** Revealed preferences (most economists, see Samuelson); net balance of pleasure over pain (Bentham); net balance of happiness over unhappiness (J. S. Mill); net balance of desirable states of consciousness over undesirable states of consciousness (Sidgwick); satisfaction of actual preferences (Murray); satisfaction of preferences which have survived full information and cognitive psychotherapy (Brandt); satisfaction of the net balance of personal but not external preferences (Harsanyi, and Dworkin 1978); net balance of positive hedonic hits over negative hedonic hits (Smart); or (my own view) whatever it is that is intrinsically valuable.

**Well-being:** That complex of things that makes a life go well for the person living that life (Griffith).

My purpose here is first to familiarize readers with how basic goods work in applied situations and then to show that they are readily applicable to the hiring problem.

### **Peter Singer's Famous Example**<sup>14</sup>

Most of us feel intuitively that we have a very strong duty to rescue those in immediate danger and only a much weaker duty to assist the needy through charitable

---

<sup>13</sup> Primary goods are normally divided into natural primary goods, such as health, vigor, intelligence, and imagination, and social primary goods, such as liberties and opportunities, income and wealth, and the social basis for self-respect.

<sup>14</sup> In this and the following section, I make use of materials adapted from Wein 2001.

giving. But this intuition has been challenged by a famous thought experiment developed by Peter Singer (Singer 1972 & 79).

Suppose that a young child in India is suffering from a lack of food. You are affluent enough to easily donate money to a charity that would use this money to save the starving Indian child. Without your donation (or one from someone else), the child will soon die. While pondering these facts you walk past a shallow pond and notice a small child struggling to stay afloat. You could easily wade into the pond and rescue the child. If you do nothing (and no one else does anything), the child will soon die. Let us suppose that the cost of dry cleaning your muddy post-rescue clothes is at least as great as the cost of the donation needed to save the Indian child. Let us also suppose that others either cannot, or will not, do anything to save either of these children.

The matrix below outlines your options and the relevant outcomes.

<b>Possible action</b>	<b>A:</b> Give nothing & do nothing	<b>B:</b> Give money & do nothing	<b>C:</b> Give nothing & wade into pool	<b>D:</b> Give money & wade into pool
<b>Expected outcome</b>	Both children will die	One child lives & one dies	One child dies & one lives	Both children live

Assuming, as is the case in most societies, one is legally permitted to do any of the four actions outlined above, the issue becomes that of what one's moral duties are. Here we find considerable disagreement, but it is fair to say that almost everyone holds that commonsense morality tells us that the duty to save the drowning child is stronger and more compelling than the duty to aid the starving Indian child. A lot of intellectual effort has been spent trying to explain why this might be so, but I think it is safe to say that Singer's position, which argues that the reasons for each of these two duties is

equally strong, remains viable.<sup>15</sup> That is to say, it seems that there is as much reason to help the one child as there is to help the other. So, options A and D seem to be the only defensible ones. (Singer goes on to argue that, given that A is unacceptable, D must be the morally proper choice.)

### **Basic Goods**

I suggest that a good part of why it is so difficult to see how our moral thinking at the theoretical or critical level could diverge so radically from our moral thinking at the practical or intuitive level is because of the metrics we use when comparing different states of affairs. Consider my list above. In terms of utility (however one conceives of it), both children stand to gain or lose roughly equally from your action or your inaction. The same is true in terms of their needs, their well-being, the primary goods they will have access to, or the resources they will have at their disposal, or the capabilities they will realize if, but only if, you help them out.<sup>16</sup> The other concepts on my list are not directly relevant to this case except for basic goods, and it is with the concept of basic goods that we notice an immediate difference, a difference which goes a long way toward explaining what commonsense morality has to say about your duties to each of the two children.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup> For my own attempt to deal with the issue (which I now think is inadequate), see Wein 2001.

<sup>16</sup> It could be argued that the Indian child loses less in the way of utility or well-being if you let her starve than if you let the other child drown, because the child you rescue from drowning will lead a better life in a society which can afford wading pools for its children than the life that the post-famine child stuck in India will be able to enjoy. The same might be said of Dworkinian resources or capabilities to function; even if you save the Indian child, the resources such a child will have, or the freedom she will have to develop and use her capabilities, will be far less than those available to the drowning child. But, as Singer anticipated, the example can easily be modified to deal with these matters without reducing its intuitive force.

<sup>17</sup> Thinking in terms of human rights is not helpful here. Of course, both children ought to be accorded the same rights just in virtue of their both being humans in dire need. But the crucial question is whether such rights are limited to negative rights or whether they include some positive ones and, if the latter, whether the positive rights include both a right to be rescued and a

Suppose that we had no moral duties and were deciding amongst ourselves whether it would be wise to adopt some. Each of us would gladly take on the duty to rescue others in times of immediate danger when such rescue could be achieved with minimal risk to ourselves, providing of course that others would take on the same duty. The small inconvenience this duty is likely to impose on us—both because we are unlikely ever to have to act on it and because, even if we do, the cost of so doing is minimal—is easily outweighed by the benefits we would receive were we unfortunate enough to need rescuing ourselves.<sup>18</sup> Having a system of individual or personal duties to rescue one another in those rare cases where the need arises is, for all of us, a basic good. It is something we want in others and would be willing to have imposed upon ourselves.

By contrast, an individual or personal duty to aid those starving individuals who are far away from us is not a basic good. It is not something it would be rational for each of us to want either in others or in ourselves. This is because personal duties result in uncoordinated action and, as the history of international development efforts shows, uncoordinated action aimed at helping those who are far removed from us and about whom we know very little often causes more harm than good.<sup>19</sup>

---

right to aid when threatened with starvation and, if so, against whom these rights held are. So the problem here is a deeper one than can be dealt with by the human rights approach. Our problem (when thought of in terms of human rights) is what rights each child ought to be accorded, and the human rights approach cannot answer this question except in a question-begging way. The global public goods approach is also unhelpful, though in a different way. Neither a system of provisions for being rescued from wading pools nor one for being provided with aid when famine strikes is a public good.

<sup>18</sup> One can interpret such a defense of the duty to rescue either in Hobbesian contractarian terms (agreeing on the duty is in the self-interest of each person) or in social contractarian terms (the system of reciprocity is of mutual benefit).

<sup>19</sup> I take it that everyone would agree with this weak claim about the history of international development efforts. If you disagree, substitute a (weaker) claim that you do accept.

This danger is, of course, one that exists for the personal duty to rescue. We can imagine a situation in which a child appears to be drowning in a wading pool but where, in fact, the child is not in danger. (Perhaps the child is pretending to drown but is quite safe.) It is possible that two passing people, each unaware of the other's efforts, rush in to save her. In their struggle to do good they bump into each other, collapse on the child, and cause her to drown. Such a scenario is possible but so unlikely that the benefits of having the personal duty to "rescue" children who only appear to be drowning clearly outweigh the costs. So, a personal duty to rescue the drowning child is a basic good.

But a personal duty to aid the starving child is not a basic good, because there is a much greater probability that uncoordinated action to save distant starving children will have unintended consequences which harm those children (or some others).<sup>20</sup> And this is just the way that commonsense morality has things. Everyone feels that we have a strong and pressing duty—one that needs to be acted on immediately—to help the drowning child. It is a duty that requires instant action, not contemplation about what ideally might be the best action. But in the case of the starving child, the duty which commonsense morality provides us is neither so strong nor so pressing. Of course, we still feel there is some duty here; somebody ought to do something for the starving child. After all, her need is just as great as that of the drowning one. But, as anyone who has made even a cursory study of international development efforts knows, what starving people need is coordinated action on the part of many people. And there is no doubt that a coordinated international response system to deal with famines and natural disasters is, for all of us, a basic good, in the same way that a domestic social safety net is a basic good. The duty to

---

<sup>20</sup> Indeed, it is likely that it is others who will be harmed. But one should not make too much of this point. For a balanced discussion, see Sen 1999, pages 254-265.

provide that response system is a *political* duty we all have.<sup>21</sup> (Unfortunately, it is one on which too few of us act.) But the duty to help far-off, starving children is not a *personal* duty requiring us to drop everything at this very moment and do something. (If you think there is such a personal duty, then you ought not to have been spending your valuable time reading this article. You ought to have been out saving a child somewhere!)

We all want to live in a world where everyone can get through life as well as possible given our sometimes conflicting projects. We try to train members of future generations to have and *feel* those moral duties that we think will best serve to help us all. We also hope that they will become the sorts of individuals who will willingly do their fair share to contribute to those projects which can best be undertaken only by *collective* efforts. (We do not need to assume here that people have a duty to do whatever is the best thing to do when confronted with collective action problems, only that they have a duty to do their fair share in such circumstances.)<sup>22</sup> A basic goods approach explains why we want to live in a world where everyone will be ready to leap into action when they see a drowning child whom they can easily save at only minor inconvenience. This approach also explains why we want people to pause and think hard and only then to act in concert with others in order to deal with the systemic problems that make life so difficult for so many people. Other approaches make it difficult to explain why morality tells us to deal with apparently similar cases in such dissimilar ways.

---

<sup>21</sup> Note that such a duty is (in historical terms) a very recent one. It could not have existed prior to the last century or so. The recent advent of this duty may go some way to explaining why it is often not recognized. As Daylian Cain pointed out to me, in the Singer case the existence of organizations like Oxfam has done much to reduce the coordination problems so that the drowning and starving child cases are becoming more similar.

<sup>22</sup> I thank Duane Windsor for making me see this point.

### **Returning to the hiring problem**

The hiring problem—while nowhere nearly as dramatic—is similar to the conflict between the duty to rescue and the duty to aid. We have a conflict between the corporation’s need to hire competent staff while protecting its reputation (something it must sometimes do in a hurry, before its competitors have hired the best job candidates and cut into its potential market). And we have important issues of privacy for individual prospective employees. Furthermore, there is the social question concerning the means by which, and the extent to which, the fledgling democracy is going to delve into past misconduct (and what it will count as misconduct). The basic goods approach is particularly helpful here. It tells us to move back a level, to the issues of what practices the corporation adopted in its own history, to what restrictions it would want on hiring across the many countries it works in, and to what its workforce can reasonably expect in terms of privacy protection.<sup>23</sup> The need to make hiring decisions in a prompt and relatively straightforward manner is contrasted with the sort of reflective and coordinated decision-making that must go on when determining how a society is going deal with those who held important posts or offices during previous regimens. Plus there will typically be an informational asymmetry here with those in the developing democracy both knowing more than the corporation and having a better feel for what information is most important.<sup>24</sup> It is always a very difficult decision whether the nation should have a special commission to investigate and prosecute such activities, or whether it should leave this task to the regular work of the fledgling system of justice, or whether it should

---

<sup>23</sup> For an excellent discussion of why corporations might want an external agency to impose restrictions on them in this area, see Kenneth Arrow 1973.

<sup>24</sup> I thank Karen Schmietz for pointing this feature out to me and impressing on me its importance.

adopt something along the lines of a truth and reconciliation commission, or whether some form of amnesty is most appropriate in the often volatile circumstances faced by fragile new democracies. These issues need to be fully and openly discussed by the new democracy and the civil society organizations within it. Indeed, such open discussion is often a vital part of the healing process.<sup>25</sup>

The basic goods approach guides the developing society and its members by giving them priority in making decisions about what rights to privacy to grant its citizens regarding their employment history, and it explains why corporations must respect those decisions even when they appear to be in partial conflict with some corporate objectives. It both grants developing nations the authority they need to retain or nourish their own sense of autonomy and grants corporations the freedom to hire with the confidence that their actions are not unduly rewarding past misconduct. In short, the basic goods approach is one that allows developing countries and multinational corporations to work together in an ethical way that furthers the only kind of development that can reasonably be expected to be viable and stable in these sorts of circumstances.<sup>26</sup>

---

<sup>25</sup> Uruguay can serve to illustrate this point. In Montevideo, where such issues received some airing in the post-dictatorship period, the populace is less concerned with issues arising from past abuses than is the rural populace, which had less of an opportunity to express its views on these matters. The differences in the political graffiti between rural towns and Montevideo amply illustrate this attitudinal variation. I thank Rodrigo Gadea for his insights in this area.

<sup>26</sup> I am grateful to Rodrigo Gadea, Duncan MacIntosh, Gary Smith, and Thea E. Smith for discussing these matters with me and to Chris Smart for making me aware that I had not fully appreciated the strengths of the global public goods approach. I wrote this paper while I was a visiting scholar at the Centro Internacional de Investigaciones para el Desarrollo in Montevideo. I am grateful to CIID for providing me with an ideal place to work on such matters. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on International Corporate Responsibility hosted by the Carnegie Bosch Institute of Carnegie Mellon University held at the Renaissance Pittsburgh Hotel, 107 Sixth Street, Pittsburgh, PA, on 7-9 June 2002. I am grateful for the comments I received at this conference.

### Selected Bibliography

- Arrow, Kenneth  
 1973 "Business Codes and Economic Efficiency" *Public Policy* 21 (summer 1973)
- Bentham, Jeremy  
 1781 *The Principles of Morals and Legislation*. (reprinted 1988). Buffalo: Prometheus Books.
- Brandt, Richard B.  
 1979 *A Theory of the Good and the Right*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Braybrooke, David  
 1987 *Meeting Needs*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Dworkin, Ronald M.  
 1978 *Taking Rights Seriously*. London: Duckworth.  
 2000 *Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gibbard, Allan  
 1990 *Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment*. New York: Harvard University Press.
- Griffin, James  
 1986 *Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hare, R. M.  
 1981 *Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point*. NY: Oxford University Press.
- Harsanyi, John C.  
 1980 *Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation*. Boston: D. Reidel.
- Kaul, Inge, Isabelle Grunberg, and Mac A. Stern (editors)  
 1999 *Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*. New York: Oxford University Press (published for the UNDP).
- Mill, John S.  
 1861 *Utilitarianism*.
- Murray, Malcolm  
 1998 "Unconsidered preferences" *South African Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 17, #4, 1998, pages 346-353.
- Nussbaum, Martha  
 2000 *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Rawls, John  
 1971 *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
 1993 *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.  
 1999 *Collected Papers*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Samuelson, P. A.  
 1961 *Economics: An Introductory Analysis* (5th ed., MacGraw-Hill).
- Sen, Amartya  
 1982 *Choice, Welfare and Measurement*. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
 1999 *Development as Freedom*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Sidgwick, Henry

1981 *The Methods of Ethics* (7th ed.). Indianapolis: Hackett.

Singer, Peter

1972 "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, Volume 1, #3 (Spring 1972).

1979 *Practical Ethics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smart, J.J.C.

1987 *Essays Metaphysical and Moral: Selected Philosophical Papers*. New York: Basil Blackwell.

Wein, Sheldon

1999 "Human Rights" in *The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia*, edited by Christopher Gray, Garland Press.

2001 "Rescuing Charitable Duties" *International Journal of Social Economics*, Volume 28, No 9, September 2001.

Forthcoming "Development and Duty: A Basic Goods Approach" *Development: Critical Issues for the Twenty-first Century* edited by R. K. Oden (Chicago: Third World Conference Foundation Inc.)