Germany’s Responsibility for WW1
- in 1961, Fritz Fischer’s book (translated into English in 1967 as Germany’s Aims in the First World War) launched a furious debate among German historians. Older historians denounced Fischer and the book, but some younger historians came to Fischer’s support. The book itself was a detailed monograph.
- in 1965, Fischer issued a 2nd book (translated into English in 1974 as World Power or Decline); this book restated his main theses and answered his critics without going into all the elaborate detail of the 1st book. The phrase—World Power or Decline—was taken from Berhardi’s famous 1912 book (translated in 1914 into English as Germany and the Next War).
- Berhardi, a general retired from the German General Staff, made a number of social darwinist arguments about the necessity and benefits of war; war was a very important element of natural selection weeding out the weak and unfit and keeping nations and ‘races’ virile and vigorous.
- he also argued that the next general European war, which he and so many other people were certain was coming very soon, would be crucial to Germany’s future. As the title suggests, Bernhardi’s thesis was that Germany had to be sure to win the coming war and use its victory to achieve domination of Europe. Germany must become a ‘world power’ or it was destined to decline.
- Fischer’s contention was that this attitude and outlook was very symptomatic of the thinking of Germany’s political and military leadership leading up to and during the crisis in 1914. Acting on these beliefs, those leaders deliberately took a number of actions which brought about the war in 1914.
- as we noted earlier, the idea that a new scale of national state—‘world power’—was going to emerge in the 20th C had been around for some time; Alexis de Tocqueville had forecast this in the 1840s and Seeley had done so in the 1880s. As also noted, Seeley’s work had been widely noted and discussed in Germany.
Fischer’s Theses
- Fischer’s main contentions can be categorised under three headings:
1 Military pressure
- there was a widely held conviction among Germany’s military and political leaders that war with Russia was inevitable. Given that Russia had, in the wake of the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, embarked on very extensive reforms and reequipment of its military, it would be better to have that war before 1917 when the reforms would be effective. There were those who advocated any excuse be seized or created to initiate a war, what we would call a preemptive war. Thus, Fischer argues that these elements wanted war, the sooner the better. The clash of Russian and Dual Monarchy interests in the Balkans had nearly led to war earlier, and the Triple Alliance would provide Germany with the excuse to join in against Russia in any conflict.
- Fischer contends that officials high up in the German military in fact went to work immediately on the news of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand to use it as a means to bring about a war. At the very least, if Russia remained aloof, the Dual Monarchy would crush Serbia and this danger to the Dual Monarchy (Germany’s most important ally) would be ended. If Russia did enter, then Germany would have its opportunity to take on the Russians in the inevitable war but on conditions more favourable to Germany than if the war came several years later.
- these military elements exercised pressure on the German government to use its influence with the Dual Monarchy’s government; However, these elements also went around their own government and using their direct contacts, began to urge both the Austrian government and Conrad, head of the Dual Monarchy’s military, to launch a war against Serbia. Not only did the Germans give the famous ‘blank cheque’, Fischer even argues that the Austrians were threatened that if they failed to act, Germany might wash its hands and leave the Dual Monarchy on its own in future. Thus, he argues that most of the responsibility for the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia and the start of the war lay with German leaders.
2. German Expansionism
- Fischer argues that Germany was the most dissatisfied of the great powers and therefore, the most eager to alter the status quo. There was widespread support in Germany for expansionism in 3 directions:
(a) MittelEuropa
- this was to be a German dominated entity occupying much of central and eastern Europe. Large areas (the low countries, the Dual Monarchy and much of western areas of the Russian Empire) would be incorporated into this entity.
- it presupposed that Russia would be greatly reduced in power and territory as a result of defeat by Germany.
- France would perhaps have its industrial north-east corner annexed by Germany and be reduced to an economic satellite of the German giant.
- this idea had been adopted by the Pan German League which was vigorous in promoting the programme.
- it was clear that neither Russia nor France would willingly accept these changes and creation of MittelEuropa would require that both be crushed militarily; war was a prerequisite.
(B) MittelAfrika
- this was the concept of joining up the 3 main German African colonies (South West Africa, German East Africa and Kamerun) to form a giant entity occupying all of central and much of east Africa. This dream had been around since the late 1890s. A German foreign minister, Caprivi, had even negotiated a jumping off point—a long finger of territory which extended from the north east corner of South West Africa; it became known as the Caprivi Strip.
- British imperialists such as Rhodes and German imperialists were in great competition to wrest control of Angola and Mozambique from the Portuguese and to get control of the areas which have now become Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi. In the end, Rhodes was successful in getting the interior areas for Britain; Germany and Britain each preferred that Angola and Mozambique remain in Portuguese hands rather than go to their rival. In effect, they cancelled each other out.
- MittelAfrika was also seemingly dependent on the creation of MittelEuropa. The Congo would come to Germany if Belgium were annexed or made a German satellite. The British would be forced to negotiate if confronted by this new German superpower dominating Europe; in effect, they would be made an offer they couldn’t refuse! Thus, it too could be realised only in the wake of a successful European war.
(c) Middle east policy
- this was the notion of expanding German influence in the Middle East all the way to Persia. This would involve displacing the British and French influence in the Ottoman Empire and might even project a threat to the British in India (this threat to India was to be one of the main elements of intimidation, along with the new navy Germany began to build in 1896, that would force the British to make concessions in Africa and elsewhere).
- a major symbol and means of projecting German influence into this area was the Berlin-Baghdad railway. It also involved German military and other aid to the Ottoman government.
3. Social and political concerns
- conservative elements, especially among the Junkers and to a considerable extent including the Kaiser, were disturbed by the growth of unions and socialist parties in Germany. They were looking for a way to stop the rot and to repress these elements.
- they saw war as the best opportunity and occasion to do this. These conservatives, including substantial numbers of the military officer corps, wanted the immediate arrest of union and socialist party leaders as soon as mobilisation orders were issued and the war began.
- therefore, war was seen as necessary cover under of which these pernicious organisations and people and the unacceptable trends that they represented could be scotched.
- hence, Fischer’s argument is that many leaders and opinion makers were clearly in favour of an early war, seeing it as the best, the quickest and perhaps the only means to achieve the important goals which they sought. While they were not all advocating deliberately provoking a war, they did see the outbreak of war as an opportunity; thus, they were not especially anxious to avoid war.
- others (one might include the chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg) were less enthusiastic about war and were concerned about both the negative effects and the possibility of losing; nevertheless, they did not oppose war very vigorously or were ineffective in preventing war. The glittering prospects held out by the hawks and Pan German enthusiasts tended to dazzle and blind them as well; if war would bring so many benefits, were they justified in thwarting the outbreak of war and the possibilities of Germany’s advancing to ‘world power’ status?
- at the least, they became divided and dilatory, but at other times, they might be swept along.
Bethmann-Hollweg
- B-H was chancellor—prime minister—in the German government. A key issue in examining the validity of Fischer’s argument is the question of whether or not B-H was pursuing these expansionist and aggressive policies.
- on the third heading, social and political concerns, B-H was very reluctant to crush unions and socialist parties. He feared the effects on national unity. On the outbreak of war, this concern led him into urgent negotiations with socialist politicians urging them not to oppose the granting of war credits. However, according to Fischer, this indicated only that B-H hoped to avoid repression of the socialists but that he was willing to do it if they did not fall into line.
- on the 1st and 2nd headings, there has been much argument about whether or not B-H allowed himself to be carried away by the Kaiser and the other hawks at the famous meeting at which it was decided to give the ‘blank cheque’ to the Dual Monarchy. There is a good deal of ambiguity. Bethmann-Hollweg was either ineffective or got caught up in the enthusiasm. Certainly, it is clear that he had qualms; nevertheless, it is Fischer’s contention that B-H too was dazzled by the possibilities and allowed himself to be swept along in spite of his reservations and concerns.
- Fischer further argues that B-H never seriously reversed himself as the crisis continued to evolve.
- early in the crisis, German strategists, especially in the military, decided that there were 3 possible outcomes if the crisis were pushed:
- a limited war between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia if Germany could threaten and intimidate everyone else to stay out;
- a general European war if the 2 alliances became involved (with Britain remaining aloof);
- a world war which would involve British participation as an enemy.
- according to Fischer, the hawks regarded the first as highly desirable; the second was acceptable as they thought there was a good chance of winning and being able to achieve the agendas outlined above.
- only the 3rd possibility produced any concern. For many of the hawks, even it was not of much real concern. They regarded the British army with great contempt; they were confident that it could not be a factor in the early stages of the war and that the war would be over before it could be built up. Thus, the British would be presented with a fait accompli which they would have to accept. However, B-H was one of those who looked on the 3rd outcome as undesirable and something to be avoided.
- historians have widely accepted the interpretation that the German government (including B-H) probably expected or at least must have recognised the high probability that the Russian government would come to the assistance of Serbia; therefore, they supported the Austrians with ‘eyes wide open’.
- the German gov’t had also ignored warnings from British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, about the seriousness of the situation. Even more there was B-H’s famous assurance to Grey that if Britain remained aloof, Germany would not make any annexations in western Europe; in other words, B-H was operating through much of the crisis under the impression (delusion?) that Britain was so reluctant to get involved that it could be easily persuaded to remain aloof. Thus, if Britain were reassured that the situation in western Europe right across the English Channel were not changed, then it would be prepared to allow Germany a free hand in central and eastern Europe. Much is made of this by Fischer.
- throughout the July Crisis, the German government worked to allow or even to push the Dual Monarchy to take military action against Serbia. Furthermore, it is inconceivable that the hesitant Dual Monarchy would have taken action if Germany had shown the least opposition. Thus, the Austrian government did not jump; it was pushed!
- it was only very late, after it finally got through to B-H that Britain was unlikely to remain aloof from a general European war, that B-H finally began to take actions which seemed to urge moderation and to show a desire to avoid war.
- most historians, even Albertini, have accepted the view that B-H had finally awakened to the danger that a ‘world’ war could erupt and was concerned to try to stop it. It was by then too late to stop the avalanche of events and Europe was swept over the precipice into war.
- Fischer, however, rejects this interpretation; he argues that the actions which B-H took in seeming efforts to halt the drift towards war were mostly for show and that he did not do anything concrete (a couple of rather wishy-washy telegrams to the Austrian government but nothing serious such as threatening to withdraw German backing if the Dual Monarchy went ahead with the attack on Serbia). B-H’s main concern was not to avoid war, but to avoid the appearance that Germany was responsible for the outbreak of war. His actions were intended to create the appearance that war was being forced upon a reluctant Germany. Thus, even when faced with the probability that Britain would become involved, B-H was prepared to go along with ‘rolling the dice’ as advocated by the hawks.
- later, during the war, B-H declared that had he known that Britain would become involved, he would have acted differently. Fischer dismisses this as second guessing after the real consequences were apparent. Like so many other Germans, in 1914 B-H too was bedazzled by the prospects for victory and the possible gains that could be made in a successful war.
Other ramifications of Fischer’s argument
- Fischer’s argument had ramifications far beyond the immediate issue of German responsibility for World War 1. It was a fundamental attack on the usual interpretation of German history from 1870 until the present.
- most German historians had looked upon the Wilhelmine period as a kind of golden age, an apex of German power and glory. After unification, Germany had flowered as an economic, colonial and military power. In contrast, the Weimar Republic and its democracy was usually despised and denigrated. Weimar was certainly a period of reduced status internationally and of corruption and economic decline internally. In the interwar period, leading historians had welcomed the rise of the Nazis because of the promise that the Nazis would restore Germany to its previous status in the Wilhelmine period.
- even in the post-1945 period, many historians continued to accept this basic framework. Some even blamed the rise of the Nazis on the Weimar Republic, claiming that the latter was so ineffective and corrupt that it opened the door to the Nazis as Germans turned to anyone who would save them from Weimar.
- the Nazis, on the other hand, were treated in the post-1945 historiography as an aberration, an atypical departure from German history and tradition. While Germans certainly had some responsibility for allowing the Nazis to take over, still the Nazis were not the true Germany.
- what aroused so much outrage in the historical establishment was Fischer’s contention that there were in fact a great many similarities and continuities between Wilhelmine Germany and the Germany of the Nazis:
- the idea of ‘lebensraum’ was borrowed almost without change from the Pan German League’s programme of expansion and the notion of MittelEuropa which had been around since the 1890s. The Pan German League’s programme of annexations in fact was adopted virtually without change in September of 1914 by the Reichstag as Germany’s official war aims. Thus, Wilhemine Germany was just as aggressive and expansionist as Nazi Germany.
- the idea of some accommodation with Britain (albeit on German terms)— “We will allow and ‘guarantee’ your empire if you give us a free hand in Europe.” This was put forward in the pre-1914 era and, as we noted, during the July crisis. This was a major idea of Hitler at times and certainly among some of the other Nazis, such as Hess and Ribbontrop. This possibility is given as a reason for Hitler ordering an easing up on the attacks on the British for several critical days during the evacuation from Dunkirk in 1940. It was still being discussed as a possibility well into the war.
- Hitler’s cogitations as recorded in the Hossbach Memorandum of 1937 are uncannily similar to German General Staff assessments before 1914 of an early war being better for Germany because it was better prepared.
- in a number of important ways, the Nazis were not only in the mainstream of thinking and aspirations of Wilhelmine Germany but were in fact just the logical extension and fulfilment.
- for Fischer and many younger German historians, the older generation of historians continued to show anti-democratic bias (against Weimar and for the more authoritarian Wilhelmine empire).
- they also showed a fundamental unwillingness to come to terms with Naziism. Until historians and Germans recognised that Naziism was not something essentially alien but in fact arose out of some of the mainstream currents in modern German history and society, the new post-1945 democratic Germany would perhaps be endangered.
- i.e., it was a danger for Germans to continue to look back nostalgically at Wilhelmine Germany; in denigrating Weimar, there would be an on-going implicit criticism of post-1945 democracy and the latter would be held up to an unfavourable (and inaccurate) comparison with Wilhelmine Germany.