Home History 203 lecture list Wallace G. Mills Hist. 203 12 Morality and Diplomacy

Morality and Diplomacy--Impact of World War I



- in the late 19th and early 20th Cs, morality was not regarded as an important element in international relations (i.e., the interactions of states and governments); the latter, in line with social darwinist thinking, was often regarded as amoral and a survival of the fittest contest.

- Bismarck's policies had tended to reinforce this; his approach had been termed 'blood and iron' and the acceptance of this as appropriate and perhaps even unavoidable in international relations was called 'realism' or 'real politik'. According to this view, outcomes were not determined by 'morality' or principles of 'justice'; they were determined by power, military force or cunning. (As an American football coach phrased it, "Nice guys finish last.") Actually, Bismarck was not so simplistic, but many did not notice. While this 'realism' may have reduced hypocrisy, it also seemed to put the stamp of approval on the new brutality.

- international relations were also viewed as anarchic. There was certainly a body of international law, but there were few mechanisms for enforcing it. There was an International Court of Justice, but for all practical purposes it was purely voluntary; disputes could only be referred if governments agreed and there was no means to force a government to accept a decision if it didn't want to. In fact, no governments were willing to use it except for relatively trivial matters (the US and Canada had used it to settle some minor boundary disputes along the Maine/New Brunswick and Washington State/British Columbia borders). The German military regarded Belgian neutrality as impractical and artificial and the treaties guaranteeing that neutrality as 'scraps of paper'. From the British perspective, going to war was the only way to call Germany to account for this violation of international law and commitments.

- national and/or dynastic interests were regarded as more important determinants and considerations than morality.

- very frequently, diplomacy was carried on 'in secret'--i.e., not only 'secret' from opponents and adversaries, but also from their own people and parliaments.

- during the first 2 years of war, diplomacy was carried on as before the war. The German Reichstag adopted the plans of the Pan-Germans to create MittelEuropa and MittelAfrika. The Allies entered into a series of secret agreements among themselves about what they planned to do with the Ottoman Empire, German colonies and so on as well as making some very extensive promises to Italy (to give large chunks of territory along the Dalmatian coast) to induce the latter to enter the war on the Allied side.

- however, there began to be a growing movement and sentiment to alter the conduct of diplomacy and international relations.

3 Factors in the Movement for Change 1. The war itself--massive sacrifices brought much more critical attitudes towards their leaders:


2. The intrusion of Woodrow Wilson and the United States

- to many Europeans, the U.S. seemed more innocent, less tainted than the governments of Europe (few looked closely at what the U. S. was doing in Latin America where it acted in as high-handed a manner as European governments). Nevertheless, Wilson seemed to present an alternative to what many regarded as the cynical, devious leaders in Europe.

- Wilson's peace proposals in 1916 altered psychological and ideological aspects of the war:


- Wilson was not the first or only person to advocate these things, but the growing strength of the U. S. in industrial capacity and economic resources, which the Allies especially required, gave great weight to what he said.

- the proposals became even more important after U.S. entry into war and were prominent in the famous Fourteen Points which was the American statement of why the war was being fought and what objectives it hoped to achieve. The war was sold as a crusade for democracy, against militarism and autocracy and against the bad old ways of conducting international relations and diplomacy.

- even more, submarine warfare, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (the treaty forced on the Bolshevik government in March 1918), etc. outraged Wilson and the war became a crusade to establish morality and justice in the conduct of international relations. In fact, after March 1918 and Brest-Litovsk, Wilson adopted a harder line and began to demand an unconditional surrender because he thought that German militarism must be defeated decisively.

- the British and French governments, especially after the withdrawal of Russia in November 1917 as a result of the Bolshevik coup d'état, needed the U.S. and had to respond in a semi-positive way. Even more, war weariness and rising domestic criticism meant that the ideas had a broad appeal; people were looking for alternatives which would help to avoid a recurrence of such horror in the future.

- in Germany, there were similar domestic pressures which the military dictatorship ignored or suppressed.

3. The Russian Revolution

- this was important in several ways:

- the liberal provisional government, which took over after the revolution in March, was under pressure from the Marxist dominated Petrograd Soviet; it was the first government to publish its war aims. These aims adopted the principle of no annexations and no indemnities (reparations); this declaration immediately put pressure on other governments to declare their war aims openly and even to adopt the same principle.

- the second revolution in November brought the Bolsheviks to the fore; they went even further in demanding an immediate peace with no annexations or indemnities; also, they began publishing the secret agreements and other aspects of diplomacy of the czarist government, much to the embarrassment of other governments (especially Britain and France who had made the agreements) but adding to the swelling tide of criticism of the way diplomacy had been conducted.

- the Bolsheviks proceeded to make peace even at the brutal cost of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

Effects


- there was a mounting demand for an end to 'secret diplomacy' and for its replacement by 'open diplomacy'.

- it was argued that principles of morality and justice and the rule of law should play a much greater role in international relations and that the amoral, international anarchy should be ended. Law and justice rather than 'might is right' should determine international relations.

- this was not entirely new; some attempts to do this before the war, most notably in the creation of the International Court of Justice or World Court in the 19th C.

- the World Court had 2 functions:

(a) Codify and apply the existing body of 'international law';

(b) Establish itself as a court of arbitration in order to settle international disputes by peaceful means instead of war.

- i.e., it attempted to provide some of the functions that domestic tribunals provide within nations and to begin to bring some aspects of the rule of law into the conduct of international relations.

- however, it was voluntary as its decisions had only 'moral authority'--there was no mechanism to enforce its decisions or pronouncements.

- in the area of international law, there was no legislative (i.e., law-making) authority; the scope of 'international law' was very limited--the Law of Nations (originated in Roman times, it was an extensive body of rules and conventions covering trade and maritime law), conventions and laws covering the treatment of diplomats and a series of international treaties and agreements (the treaty regarding Belgian neutrality had been one of these).

- people now began asking for more; especially, they were aware of two problems:


League of Nations Concept

- this was the concept which emerged to try to satisfy these aspirations; it was not an entirely new idea as similar proposals had been advanced a number of times over the previous 200-300 years. The idea was to create a kind of international parliament.

- it would provide a legislative (law-making) body (the Assembly); it would have permanent administrative organisations to monitor what was happening and to help coordinate actions among the members;

- it would provide enforcement mechanisms--collective security (many governments acting together could provide protection and security for each other, even against large states and deter potential aggressor states) and a range of collective actions with sanctions (diplomatic isolation, economic restrictions of varying intensity up to full scale blockade). These enforcement mechanisms were to be applied by the League Council of 15 nations.

- 'collective security' was supposed to replace the system of defence by individual states and the 'international anarchy' in which only the strong survived and dominated.

- in short, the League was an attempt to transfer to international relations the concepts of justice and morality that are used within states. Some even saw it as the beginning of world government.

- American historians tend to attribute the idea of the League almost entirely to Woodrow Wilson, but this is not accurate. The British Imperial War Cabinet (this included representatives from the dominions such as Canada and Australia) set up a special committee under Gen. Smuts of South Africa to develop a similar idea. In fact, the work of the committee influenced many aspects of the constitution of the League. However, it is true that Wilson made creation of the League his crusade and insisted on it being included in the Treaty of Versailles as a means of ensuring that it actually came into existence. The United States had become so important that Wilson's wishes could not be ignored.

Disillusionment with War

- disillusionment was felt first by those participating, especially by the men in the trenches. Trench warfare was ghastly--mud, misery, and slaughter--nothing like the glory so many had imagined before the war; it also increasingly was perceived to be never-ending.

- soldiers on both sides began to lose confidence in the generals and what they were doing. It was not long before most soldiers were aware that their governments were systematically withholding the truth and were misinforming the civilian population about what was happening. The Allies especially managed news and developed propaganda techniques.

- it was also a common experience for soldiers on both sides to find when they had been allowed to return home on leave that they had difficulty talking to civilians about the war (see All Quiet on the Western Front ). They could not share the old patriotism and enthusiastic support of the war effort. Even, they could not share the hatred against the enemy soldiers; their hatred tended to be directed more against the generals and politicians on both sides while the differences between their own and those of the enemy began to appear less and less. Sometimes they felt that they had more in common with enemy soldiers--all were victims.

- some were even surprised that they were relieved to return to the battlefield even though they knew it meant almost certain death or serious injury.

- among the British, experience in the trenches tended to break down class barriers and it produced a feeling that when the war was over, the servicemen (officers and men) should return home and make some permanent changes in the social and political systems.

- this last impulse was short-lived, but it did produce a political movement of veterans (officers and men) in the post-war period; it was probably one of the factors which helped to bring the Labour Party to power briefly in the 1920s as a reaction to the failures of the governments. David Lloyd George (his surname is Lloyd George--like a hyphenated name, but without the hyphen), as prime minister, had promised to create a 'world fit for heroes'; instead there was depression and unemployment (made worse by Churchill's 'monetarist' policy of returning to the 'gold standard').

- civilians (especially the upper and middle classes, perhaps working classes too) were buoyed up by hatred; as suffering and costs mounted, there was a strong desire for revenge.

- by the end of the war, these feelings were very strong and politicians used these or were forced to promise that someone would pay (Lloyd George in the 'Khaki' election promised "to squeeze Germany until the pips squeak"); these feelings strongly influenced the Peace negotiations, especially in regard to the 'war guilt' and reparations issues.

- such feelings soon began to dissipate in Britain and shortly after, a reaction set in; by the middle 1920s, there was a growing feeling that Germany had been too harshly treated. However, the bitterness in France was stronger, more deeply rooted and continued to affect French actions throughout the 1920s. This last is not too surprising given the fact that France suffered proportionately more casualties than any other belligerent and (with the exception of Belgium) much more property damage.

Reparations

- 'to the victor goes the spoils' is an idea as old as war itself; the idea of making compensation and restitution for injuries and damages (that is the basic idea) is established in most civil legal systems; European governments in the 19th century had altered the idea so that winners forced losers to pay regardless of fault or blame (German government after Franco-Prussian War imposed reparations of 5 billion francs on France; various governments imposed reparations against the Chinese Imperial governments); however, the practice of imposing indemnities on defeated enemies is also a very old one.

- in fact, at the beginning of the war, both the French and German governments stated that they intended to force their enemies to pay for the war. Thus, neither raised taxes, but instead set out to borrow the money; these debts were to be recouped from the indemnities and reparations imposed upon the enemy. It is good to keep this in mind in light of Germany's complaints later; the German government intended to do the same thing if it won.

- the Americans arrived in Paris for the peace negotiations without too much interest in reparations themselves (not surprising since their casualties were relatively small compared to most combatants and the U.S. did rather well economically out of the war); however, they had to concede to the insistence of the British and French.

- Pres. Wilson, and to some extent public opinion, demanded that international relations be based more upon legal and ethical principles. As a result, there was a need to find some moral or legal justification for demanding reparations. It was no longer satisfactory for the winners to simply impose a huge reparations bill on the losers. In civil law, compensation for injury or damage is usually based upon the principle of fault or blame. This is the reason for the 'war guilt' clauses that were inserted into the Treaty of Versailles. The 'war guilt' clauses required Germany to accept virtually all the responsibility and blame for the war. Thus, there was an attempt to base the reparations payments upon a natural law principle rather than on the principle of the bully-- "I defeated you so you must pay".

- the German government and people strongly rejected the idea of the 'war guilt'; however, when threatened with further military action if they did not sign the treaty, the government signed. However, the 'war guilt' created great outrage among German nationalists, and Hitler and the Nazis used it to great political advantage.


- there were several issues involved in deciding whether reparations were appropriate:

Self-determination

- this concept became and remains inextricably intertwined with nationalism; this means that, like nationalism, it is subject to many different meanings.

- its core idea is that groups, especially national groups 'nations' (with all the different definitions that can entail) should be free to make basic decisions about their present and future existence as groups (i.e., able to determine these issues for themselves) without interference or domination by other groups or governments;

- these decisions include such issues as: form of government, citizenship, and defining of group (national) objectives.

- this concept continues to bedevil international politics because in the presence of competing, exclusivist group (national) interests, the conflicting demands cannot be satisfied (e.g., the Middle East, Northern Ireland, most parts of Africa, Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and the area that used to be part of the Soviet Union; we probably have to include Canada as well)

- at the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, the leaders had to decide what should be done about eastern and central Europe where for centuries the majority of peoples had been governed as part of multinational autocracies; again, there was a desire to base the decisions on ethical and impartial principles. Self-determination seemed to be the answer; in most cases, it seemed to mean the right of ethnic/linguistic groups to form their own geographically defined and internationally recognised national state. It seemed to mean that in the dismantling of the dynasties and in the drawing of boundaries and frontiers, ethnic and linguistic factors would be paramount considerations although it was conceded that economic and political viability of the new states would also have to be considered.

Problems in Implementing

- this issue of self-determination has been raised in Canada in several ways in recent years. This concept is at the heart of the 'independence' movement in Quebec. Various native groups have also put forward various claims for self-determination without clear definitions of exactly what they mean by the term. Thus, the concept is still a live and unresolved political issue in a number of places in the world.


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