Morality and Diplomacy--Impact of World War I
- in the late 19th and early 20th Cs, morality was not regarded as an important element
in international relations (i.e., the interactions of states and governments); the
latter, in line with social darwinist thinking, was often regarded as amoral and
a survival of the fittest contest.
- Bismarck's policies had tended to reinforce this; his approach had been termed
'blood and iron' and the acceptance of this as appropriate and perhaps even unavoidable
in international relations was called 'realism' or 'real politik'. According to this
view, outcomes were not
determined by 'morality' or principles of 'justice'; they were determined by power,
military force or cunning. (As an American football coach phrased it, "Nice guys
finish last.") Actually, Bismarck was not so simplistic, but many did not notice.
While this 'realism' may have reduced hypocrisy, it also seemed to put the stamp of approval
on the new brutality.
- international relations were also viewed as anarchic. There was certainly a body
of international law, but there were few mechanisms for enforcing it. There was an
International Court of Justice, but for all practical purposes it was purely voluntary;
disputes could only be referred if governments agreed and there was no means to force
a government to accept a decision if it didn't want to. In fact, no governments were
willing to use it except for relatively trivial matters (the US and Canada had used
it to settle some minor boundary disputes along the Maine/New Brunswick and Washington
State/British Columbia borders). The German military regarded Belgian neutrality
as impractical and artificial and the treaties guaranteeing that neutrality as 'scraps
of paper'. From the British perspective, going to war was the only way to call Germany
to account for this violation of international law and commitments.
- national and/or dynastic interests were regarded as more important determinants
and considerations than morality.
- very frequently, diplomacy was carried on 'in secret'--i.e., not only 'secret' from
opponents and adversaries, but also from their own people and parliaments.
- during the first 2 years of war, diplomacy was carried on as before the war. The
German Reichstag adopted the plans of the Pan-Germans to create MittelEuropa and
MittelAfrika. The Allies entered into a series of secret agreements among themselves
about what they planned to do with the Ottoman Empire, German colonies and so on as well
as making some very extensive promises to Italy (to give large chunks of territory
along the Dalmatian coast) to induce the latter to enter the war on the Allied side.
- however, there began to be a growing movement and sentiment to alter the conduct
of diplomacy and international relations.
3 Factors in the Movement for Change
1. The war itself--massive sacrifices brought much more critical attitudes towards
their leaders:
- how and why had diplomats and diplomacy brought Europe and the world to this horror?
- were the traditions and personnel of diplomacy a factor in prolonging the war?
- the diplomats were almost exclusively upper class and there was a growing feeling
that there was not enough democratic control. The war revealed that the consequences
of diplomacy were borne by all of society and were too serious to be left to a small
elite. There was a growing feeling that these matters should be handled differently.
- the anti-war and pacifist movements had been overwhelmed at the beginning of the
war, they began to revive later on and even more after the war.
2. The intrusion of Woodrow Wilson and the United States
- to many Europeans, the U.S. seemed more innocent, less tainted than the governments
of Europe (few looked closely at what the U. S. was doing in Latin America where
it acted in as high-handed a manner as European governments). Nevertheless, Wilson
seemed to present an alternative to what many regarded as the cynical, devious leaders
in Europe.
- Wilson's peace proposals in 1916 altered psychological and ideological aspects
of the war:
- he pleaded for a negotiated peace, one with no winners and no losers; things should
return to the status quo ante--the way things were before the war.
- he urged an open declaration of war aims by all combatants-- "what do you want to
achieve at the end?" This was to keep the belligerents from upping their demands
every time they appeared to be gaining. Also, if the governments have to state openly
what they are after, they might have to be more reasonable in their demands.
- he advocated 'open diplomacy' for the future as an alternative to 'secret diplomacy'.
- Wilson was not the first or only person to advocate these things, but the growing
strength of the U. S. in industrial capacity and economic resources, which the Allies
especially required, gave great weight to what he said.
- the proposals became even more important after U.S. entry into war and were prominent
in the famous Fourteen Points which was the American statement of why the war was
being fought and what objectives it hoped to achieve. The war was sold as a crusade
for democracy, against militarism and autocracy and against the bad old ways of conducting
international relations and diplomacy.
- even more, submarine warfare, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (the treaty forced on
the Bolshevik government in March 1918), etc. outraged Wilson and the war became
a crusade to establish morality and justice in the conduct of international relations.
In fact, after March 1918 and Brest-Litovsk, Wilson adopted a harder line and began to
demand an unconditional surrender because he thought that German militarism must
be defeated decisively.
- the British and French governments, especially after the withdrawal of Russia in
November 1917 as a result of the Bolshevik coup d'état, needed the U.S. and had to
respond in a semi-positive way. Even more, war weariness and rising domestic criticism
meant that the ideas had a broad appeal; people were looking for alternatives which
would help to avoid a recurrence of such horror in the future.
- in Germany, there were similar domestic pressures which the military dictatorship
ignored or suppressed.
3. The Russian Revolution
- this was important in several ways:
- the liberal provisional government, which took over after the revolution in March,
was under pressure from the Marxist dominated Petrograd Soviet; it was the first
government to publish its war aims. These aims adopted the principle of no annexations
and no indemnities (reparations); this declaration immediately put pressure
on other governments to declare their war aims openly and even to adopt the same
principle.
- the second revolution in November brought the Bolsheviks to the fore; they went
even further in demanding an immediate peace with no annexations or indemnities;
also, they began publishing the secret agreements and other aspects of diplomacy
of the czarist government, much to the embarrassment of other governments (especially Britain
and France who had made the agreements) but adding to the swelling
tide of criticism of the way diplomacy had been conducted.
- the Bolsheviks proceeded to make peace even at the brutal cost of the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk.
Effects
- there was a mounting demand for an end to 'secret diplomacy' and for its replacement
by 'open diplomacy'.
- it was argued that principles of morality and justice and the rule of law should
play a much greater role in international relations and that the amoral, international
anarchy should be ended. Law and justice rather than 'might is right' should determine international relations.
- this was not entirely new; some attempts to do this before the war, most notably
in the creation of the International Court of Justice or World Court in the 19th C.
- the World Court
had 2 functions:
(a) Codify and apply the existing body of 'international law';
(b) Establish itself as a court of arbitration in order to settle international disputes
by peaceful means instead of war.
- i.e., it attempted to provide some
of the functions that domestic tribunals provide within nations and to begin to bring
some aspects of the rule of law into the conduct of international relations.
- however, it was voluntary as its decisions had only 'moral authority'--there was
no mechanism to enforce its decisions or pronouncements.
- in the area of international law, there was no legislative (i.e., law-making) authority;
the scope of 'international law' was very limited--the Law of Nations (originated
in Roman times, it was an extensive body of rules and conventions covering trade
and maritime law), conventions and laws covering the treatment of diplomats and a series
of international treaties and agreements (the treaty regarding Belgian neutrality
had been one of these).
- people now began asking for more; especially, they were aware of two problems:
- there needed to be some sort of legislative body to be able to make new laws and
thus extend the rule of law much more broadly;
- some means to administer and enforce the law in order to achieve compliance.
League of Nations Concept
- this was the concept which emerged to try to satisfy these aspirations; it was not
an entirely new idea as similar proposals had been advanced a number of times over
the previous 200-300 years. The idea was to create a kind of international parliament.
- it would provide a legislative (law-making) body (the Assembly); it would have
permanent administrative organisations to monitor what was happening and to help
coordinate actions among the members;
- it would provide enforcement mechanisms--collective security (many governments acting
together could provide protection and security for each other, even against large
states and deter potential aggressor states) and a range of collective actions with
sanctions (diplomatic isolation, economic restrictions of varying intensity up to full
scale blockade). These enforcement mechanisms were to be applied by the League Council
of 15 nations.
- 'collective security' was supposed to replace the system of defence by individual
states and the 'international anarchy' in which only the strong survived and dominated.
- in short, the League was an attempt to transfer to international relations the
concepts of justice and morality that are used within states. Some even saw it as
the beginning of world government.
- American historians tend to attribute the idea of the League almost entirely to
Woodrow Wilson, but this is not accurate. The British Imperial War Cabinet (this
included representatives from the dominions such as Canada and Australia) set up
a special committee under Gen. Smuts of South Africa to develop a similar idea. In fact, the
work of the committee influenced many aspects of the constitution of the League.
However, it is true that Wilson made creation of the League his crusade and insisted
on it being included in the Treaty of Versailles as a means of ensuring that it actually
came into existence. The United States had become so important that Wilson's wishes
could not be ignored.
Disillusionment with War
- disillusionment was felt first by those participating, especially by the men in
the trenches. Trench warfare was ghastly--mud, misery, and slaughter--nothing like
the glory so many had imagined before the war; it also increasingly was perceived
to be never-ending.
- soldiers on both sides began to lose confidence in the generals and what they were
doing. It was not long before most soldiers were aware that their governments were
systematically withholding the truth and were misinforming the civilian population
about what was happening. The Allies especially managed news and developed propaganda
techniques.
- it was also a common experience for soldiers on both sides to find when they had
been allowed to return home on leave that they had difficulty talking to civilians
about the war (see All Quiet on the Western Front
). They could not share the old patriotism and enthusiastic support of the war effort.
Even, they could not share the hatred against the enemy soldiers; their hatred tended
to be directed more against the generals and politicians on both sides while the
differences between their own and those of the enemy began to appear less and less.
Sometimes they felt that they had more in common with enemy soldiers--all were victims.
- some were even surprised that they were relieved to return to the battlefield even
though they knew it meant almost certain death or serious injury.
- among the British, experience in the trenches tended to break down class barriers
and it produced a feeling that when the war was over, the servicemen (officers and
men) should return home and make some permanent changes in the social and political
systems.
- this last impulse was short-lived, but it did produce a political movement of veterans
(officers and men) in the post-war period; it was probably one of the factors which
helped to bring the Labour Party to power briefly in the 1920s as a reaction to the failures of the governments. David Lloyd George (his surname is Lloyd George--like
a hyphenated name, but without the hyphen), as prime minister, had promised to create
a 'world fit for heroes'; instead there was depression and unemployment (made worse
by Churchill's 'monetarist' policy of returning to the 'gold standard').
- civilians (especially the upper and middle classes, perhaps working classes too)
were buoyed up by hatred; as suffering and costs mounted, there was a strong desire
for revenge.
- by the end of the war, these feelings were very strong and politicians used these
or were forced to promise that someone would pay (Lloyd George in the 'Khaki' election
promised "to squeeze Germany until the pips squeak"); these feelings strongly influenced the Peace negotiations, especially in regard to the 'war guilt' and reparations
issues.
- such feelings soon began to dissipate in Britain and shortly after, a reaction
set in; by the middle 1920s, there was a growing feeling that Germany had been too
harshly treated. However, the bitterness in France was stronger, more deeply rooted
and continued to affect French actions throughout the 1920s. This last is not too surprising
given the fact that France suffered proportionately more casualties than any other
belligerent and (with the exception of Belgium) much more property damage.
Reparations
- 'to the victor goes the spoils' is an idea as old as war itself; the idea of making
compensation and restitution for injuries and damages (that is the basic idea) is
established in most civil legal systems; European governments in the 19th century
had altered the idea so that winners forced losers to pay regardless of fault or blame
(German government after Franco-Prussian War imposed reparations of 5 billion francs
on France; various governments imposed reparations against the Chinese Imperial governments); however, the practice of imposing indemnities on defeated enemies is also a
very old one.
- in fact, at the beginning of the war, both the French and German governments stated
that they intended to force their enemies to pay for the war. Thus, neither raised
taxes, but instead set out to borrow the money; these debts were to be recouped from
the indemnities and reparations imposed upon the enemy. It is good to keep this in mind
in light of Germany's complaints later; the German government intended to do the
same thing if it won.
- the Americans arrived in Paris for the peace negotiations without too much interest
in reparations themselves (not surprising since their casualties were relatively
small compared to most combatants and the U.S. did rather well economically out of
the war); however, they had to concede to the insistence of the British and French.
- Pres. Wilson, and to some extent public opinion, demanded that international relations
be based more upon legal and ethical principles. As a result, there was a need to
find some moral or legal justification for demanding reparations. It was no longer
satisfactory for the winners to simply impose a huge reparations bill on the losers.
In civil law, compensation for injury or damage is usually based upon the principle
of fault or blame. This is the reason for the 'war guilt' clauses that were inserted
into the Treaty of Versailles. The 'war guilt' clauses required Germany to accept virtually
all the responsibility and blame for the war. Thus, there was an attempt to base
the reparations payments upon a natural law principle rather than on the principle
of the bully-- "I defeated you so you must pay".
- the German government and people strongly rejected the idea of the 'war guilt';
however, when threatened with further military action if they did not sign the treaty,
the government signed. However, the 'war guilt' created great outrage among German
nationalists, and Hitler and the Nazis used it to great political advantage.
- there were several issues involved in deciding whether reparations were appropriate:
- Long-term and philosophical
. Are reparations a sound basis for building a successful peace (i.e., one which
will reduce hostilities and the dangers of renewed war in the future)? Is there
realistically any way to compensate for the losses and sufferings of modern war?
How can you compensate for the dead and the permanently disabled?
- Definitional
. What losses and costs should be included in determining the totals demanded? Obviously,
the dead and maimed cannot be replaced physically, nor can the consumer goods which
would have been produced had the nation's resources not been diverted to military purposes be replaced (i.e., the wartime reductions in standards of living cannot
be undone).
- how much of the property destruction and the cost of restoring devastated areas
should be included? If only physical damage to civilian property were included,
Britain would receive little beyond compensation for merchant shipping sunk by submarines
and some small losses from air bombing (zeppelins).
- how much of governmental costs (especially the foreign debts incurred in fighting
the war), and how much of the on-going social costs (pensions and medical care for
those permanently requiring medical attention and economic aid, including not only
veterans but the widows and other dependents of soldiers who died or were incapacitated)
should be considered? These issues were not resolved at the Peace Conference but
were turned over to a special commission. As time went on, more and more elements
were added and thus, the final total of reparations ballooned.
- also, it was decided to pool all claims with payments being distributed proportionately.
This encouraged governments to inflate claims.
- Strategic considerations
. This was primarily a French preoccupation and was a very thinly veiled 'hidden
agenda'. More than just the desire to repair the physical damage of war, so much
of which was fought on French soil, reparations also embodied a desire to get revenge
and perhaps more importantly, they embodied a desire to so reduce and cripple Germany that
it would never again be able to threaten or to inflict such an ordeal upon France.
- Economic and practical considerations
. Even though at least one economist had drawn attention to this before the war,
few understood the basic underlying impracticability of reparations on any scale.
One of the first to do so was the young John Maynard Keynes and he pointed this
out quite clearly in his book The Economic Consequences of the Peace
(1919).
- Keynes not only pointed out that Germany was incapable of making the payments demanded
without reducing German standards of living to inhuman levels, but even more significantly
pointed out that recipients of reparations could not afford to receive the massive reparations without destruction of their own economies.
- it was all very well to talk about vast sums of dollars, pounds, marks, and so,
but in practical terms, reparations had to be paid in goods and services. Withdrawing
the goods and services on such massive scales from the German economy would reduce
the standards of living to miserable levels. While hatreds were so high, many were not
going to lose much sleep over that. But what would happen to the countries receiving
the goods and services? A flood of goods coming into the economy would produce great unemployment. There was already widespread and persistent unemployment anyway.
- the issue was also complicated by the issue of war debts; on this issue, the Americans
were especially hypocritical. They said, "We don't want reparations, but we do want
every nickel borrowed by our 'associates' [the Americans never used the word 'ally']." The biggest borrowers were Britain and France, although some of the British
borrowings had been on behalf of other governments. The British government had suggested
(this was the British practice) that war debts be reduced or forgiven entirely--the
British were owed a little more than they owed the Americans. The Americans angrily
rejected this idea as a sleazy welshing on a bargain by the British and ended up
being much harsher and more demanding with its 'associates' and friends than it was
with its 'enemy'. Later, the British did say that they would demand and accept reparations
only to the extent required to repay their war loans.
- the same principles and problems existed with regard to the payment of massive
war debts as with reparations. Few understood or listened during the next decade.
Several bandaids were applied: It was recognised that the German economy would
have to get restarted if it was to make reparations payments, but the U. S. was now the financial
powerhouse and world centre. Thus, the Americans made loans to Germany which made
reparations payment to Britain and France which made payments on their war debts.
It was a merry-go-round in which German reparations obligations and Allied war debts
were gradually being exchanged for loans to the Germans by the Americans. Also,
it was only possible to keep the game going as long as the Americans were willing
or able to keep making new loans. The Great Depression finally laid this idea to rest. The
Americans couldn't make additional loans, the Germans said they couldn't pay reparations
and the Allies said they couldn't repay war debts. In practice, Germany made very
little payment of reparations, except just after the war for some in kind replacement
of railway rolling stock and some coal.
Self-determination
- this concept became and remains inextricably intertwined with nationalism; this
means that, like nationalism, it is subject to many different meanings.
- its core idea is that groups, especially national groups 'nations' (with all the
different definitions that can entail) should be free to make basic decisions about
their present and future existence as groups (i.e., able to determine these issues
for themselves) without interference or domination by other groups or governments;
- these decisions include such issues as: form of government, citizenship, and defining
of group (national) objectives.
- this concept continues to bedevil international politics because in the presence
of competing, exclusivist group (national) interests, the conflicting demands cannot
be satisfied (e.g., the Middle East, Northern Ireland, most parts of Africa, Bulgaria,
Rumania, Yugoslavia, and the area that used to be part of the Soviet Union; we probably
have to include Canada as well)
- at the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, the leaders had to decide what should
be done about eastern and central Europe where for centuries the majority of peoples
had been governed as part of multinational autocracies; again, there was a desire
to base the decisions on ethical and impartial principles. Self-determination seemed to
be the answer; in most cases, it seemed to mean the right of ethnic/linguistic groups
to form their own geographically defined and internationally recognised national
state. It seemed to mean that in the dismantling of the dynasties and in the drawing
of boundaries and frontiers, ethnic and linguistic factors would be paramount considerations
although it was conceded that economic and political viability of the new states
would also have to be considered.
Problems in Implementing
- Rarely were ethnic groups as compact and as easily defined geographically as the
concept required; almost always the groups were so intertwined that no matter how
the boundaries were drawn, most states had one or more ethnic minorities while some
of their own people were minorities in other states. In this context, self-determination
created as many problems as it solved.
- Plebiscites (i.e., a general vote of the population). This was put forward as
the way to solve the problem of those areas where it was impossible to decide to
which state they should be attached; this seemed very democratic. However, this
can incorporate the tyranny of the majority; such votes are determined by 50% plus 1. Moreover,
it opens the door to fixing of voting by determined, organised groups and outside
supervision (officials of the League of Nations, U.N., etc.) is rarely effective.
- Reduction of Germany. This preoccupation was pursued with determination by the
French. As a result, the principle of self-determination was several times violated.
Danzig, where the majority of the population was German, and its surrounding area
was cut off from Germany and became a part of the Polish Corridor to provide Poland with
an outlet to the Baltic Sea, although Danzig itself remained a 'free city' under
the League of Nations and did not become a part of Poland. The predominantly German
populated area of Sudetenland was attached to Czechoslovakia in the interests of providing
better economic and military boundaries for the new state. The new predominantly
German state of Austria was forbidden to be joined to Germany. Alsace-Lorraine,
which had been taken from France after the Franco-Prussian War and which had become majority
German-speaking was placed under French control although its ultimate fate was to
be determined in a referendum within 20 years. All of these things became 'grievances'
which were exploited so successfully by Hitler.
- Colonial Peoples. This involved two areas: the colonies and empires of the defeated
powers (primarily those of Germany and Turkey) and other colonial peoples.
- initially, Britain and France had intended to divide German and Turkish empires
between themselves (including some of the Dominions in the case of Britain--South
West Africa to South Africa and New Guinea, etc. to Australia). The new emphasis
on morality and justice and Wilson's opposition forced some modification of such blatant greed.
The solution was the 'Mandate' system. The empires were divided pretty much as
planned but the territories were not granted outright; the League of Nations officially
took control and then delegated or mandated the governing of the territories to the
various governments on the understanding that the latter would act as trustees and
govern in the interests of the local people. It was specifically stated that this
was to be an interim status with the ultimate objective to be the independence of the people
and territory; in the meantime, each trustee must render an account of its actions
and progress in an annual report to the League. This was the origin of the long
dispute over South Africa's involvement in Namibia that was ended only a few years ago.
- nationalism was also starting in many colonial areas, especially British colonies.
The leaders of these movements saw the Peace Conference and the idea of self-determination
as a means of advancing and even of achieving their goals of independence. Thus, many made the trip to Paris to put forward their claims to self-determination.
In the face of British and French opposition, they were not recognised and in effect
their claims were rejected. There was some effect, however, because henceforth the
remaining colonial powers felt compelled to justify the continuance of colonialism on
the basis of trusteeship and benefits provided (education, health, economic development,
etc.).
- this issue of self-determination has been raised in Canada in several ways in recent
years. This concept is at the heart of the 'independence' movement in Quebec. Various
native groups have also put forward various claims for self-determination without clear definitions of exactly what they mean by the term. Thus, the concept is still
a live and unresolved political issue in a number of places in the world.