Home History 203 lecture list Wallace G. Mills Hist. 203 1 Social & Econ. Change

Social and Economic Change

- the effects of the industrial revolution were being felt strongly in Europe during the 19th C and into the 20th C (beginning in Britain but spreading elsewhere subsequently). By ‘industrial revolution’ I include all the related enhancements and increments—in agriculture, in transportation and communications, in finance, etc.; all elements were interrelated and reinforced each other. In the 2nd term, we shall talk a bit more about what is involved and outline Walt W. Rostow’s theory. However, I do want to talk about some general aspects here.

- look at the 2 tables from Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.. 2 features to notice showing changes 1750-1900:

  1. the surging ahead of Europe and later the U.S. while other areas (China & India—Japan too until the 1860s) stagnated and even declined. This shows in both per capita industrialisation and in the share of world manufacturing output.

    - remember that for many hundreds of years, China and India had been the dominant manufacturing areas of the world, excelling in both quantity and quality of so many goods. Europe had in fact been a relative backwater.

    - the decline of Asia was both relative and real. If other areas are surging ahead (as Europe began to do), staying the same means you fall behind—i.e., a relative decline.

    - however, the growing flood of cheaper manufactured goods from Europe in the 19th C plus the instability in China meant that some manufacturing was reduced and destroyed—a real decline. The most stunning example was Indian cotton manufacturing, which after being dominant in the world until the last half of the 18th C, declined and was almost wiped out by the flood of cheap cottons from Britain in the 19th C.

  2. the tremendous divergence in Europe itself; western and northern Europe surged ahead while southern and eastern Europe lagged far behind.

    - because it was the 1st to industrialise, Britain represents one extreme on the spectrum and the results show up in almost all measures of economic and social conditions. The unindustrialised areas of southern and eastern Europe, on the other hand, continued to be characterised by abysmal poverty and harsh living conditions right down to the beginning of the 20th C.

Urbanisation

 - one of the obvious effects and also an indicator of industrialisation and the various dimensions of the industrial revolution is urbanisation (see the 2 maps in The End of the European Era comparing 1870 and 1914).

- the increase in urbanisation is an indication of increased productivity in agriculture; more people are freed from the necessity to produce food and thus are freed from agriculture to go into cities to take up industrial and urban tasks. Before industrialisation, high proportions of the population were taken up in agriculture (today in Canada, less than 5% are in agriculture). By about 1850, Britain passed the 50% mark—more than half the population was living in cities.

- urbanisation also indicates expanded, cheap transportation capacities (canals, roads and railroads) to get the increased quantities of food and products to the expanding numbers in the cities.

- to some extent there was a transfer of food (especially grain) from the almost exclusively agricultural areas of southern and eastern Europe to the growing industrial cities of northern and western Europe, although less than is sometimes supposed.

- e.g., in spite of a population explosion, Britain managed, on balance, to meet most of its grain requirements domestically in the 18th C (importing in some years, but also exporting at times), but it began to import more in the 19th C from North America and from eastern Europe. Until about 1870, Britain still grew most of its own food, including grain;

- after 1870 there was a great increase in grain imports and a massive decline in grain production. Nevertheless, dairy farming and market gardening continued to grow to supply the demands of the cities and the rising standards of living. This is important because some earlier historians looked mostly at the statistics for wheat and drew some overly pessimistic conclusions about agriculture; while grain production declined because of foreign competition, many producers switched into higher value production of dairy, fruits and vegetables. However, late in the 19th C as refrigerated ships began to be built, foreign competition in butter, meat and later fruits also began to have effects on British agriculture.

 - the increased productivity in the agricultural revolution not only freed increasing numbers of the population from agricultural tasks, but it also allowed rising standards of living and consumption. This was so in Britain in spite of the population explosion which began in the 1740s, reached a maximum growth in the 1790-1810 period and did not begin a real slowdown until after 1870.



- although the dates are not exactly the same, the following figures provide some comparison for an overlapping period:



- Britain’s population quadrupled (in spite of high emigration) in the 100 years while elsewhere populations had not even doubled over a 90 year period.

- in the 18th and 19th Cs, the increases in agriculture were remarkable as were the effects. Even in the 18th C in Britain, there was much higher consumption of meat as well as the luxury imports of coffee, tea and sugar than in most other parts of Europe. By 1850, despite great pockets of poverty and living standards and conditions which seem appalling to us, British workers, even in agriculture, were on average significantly better fed, clothed and housed than elsewhere in Europe or in Britain in the early 18th C. That improvement had accelerated in the 19th C.



- while average wages increased, some portions of the population did experience declines in real wages and thus of standards of living.

How bad were the effects of industrialisation?

 - in the 19th C a long line of novelists (including Dickens, Mrs. Gaitskill, and even Benjamin Disraeli) and commentators (including Wm Cobbett, Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels) criticised conditions in mines, factories and cities, conditions and standards of living. Far too often conditions were dismal and even appalling. Marx and Engels in their book, The Condition of the English Working Classes, charged that the results of industrialisation under laisser-faire capitalism was a picture which showed “Capitalism reeking blood from every pore.” (Please remember this lurid image because we shall want to compare industrialisation in the Soviet Union under ‘socialism’ to see how it compares in the 20th C.)

- the picture presented by these writers is true in many respects as far as it goes, but it does need context and some qualifications. It certainly describes what some elements of the population experienced—slums, malnutrition, poor safety, unemployment, etc. etc. However, it is not the entire story.

- industrialisation and urbanisation involve a number of costs as well as benefits. As can easily happen (and certainly did in Britain), the burden of the costs and the benefits do not get shared equally or equitably. Some share only costs with no benefits and vice versa. Also, entire groups of people can be left behind or destroyed economically.

Hand-loom weavers

 - the hand-loom weavers are a classic example: in the 1770s-90s, the rapid advance of technology in spinning yarns (spinning jennies and later powered spinning machines) created enormous demand for weavers to turn the yarn into cloth. This created the ‘golden age’ of the handloom weavers with good wages plus everyone who wanted a job, even young children, could be employed. Then, late in the 18th C, power looms began to be invented; at first, they were crude and could only be used for making rough cotton cloth. However, with continual improvement in the 19th C, increasingly power looms began to displace handloom weavers and to force wages down.

- early in the 19th C, some weavers tried to respond by wrecking the machines (these were the Luddites). This failed (a number of people convicted of doing this ended up being transported to Australia) and the result was a long term decline of the handloom weavers that was finally finished only by the beginning of the 1840s. Many of them found it difficult or impossible to change and retrain. Thus, the agony of the handloom weavers came to symbolise one aspect of industrialisation—continuing change and obsolescence, sometimes of jobs and skills. [This remains a fact of life today and the process seems to be accelerating as technological change is even faster today; heavy industry is being replaced (at least in a relative sense) by computers and knowledge-based industries. Experts say that more and more people must expect to learn and practice more than one career in a working lifetime.]

- however, the new spinning and weaving factories did provide jobs and higher wages. Thus, other workers were experiencing increases in incomes and employment opportunities.

The myth of the ‘Golden Age’

 - another point in evaluating industrialisation and urbanisation in Britain in the 19th C is to avoid the myth of the ‘Golden Age’ of the past. Many historians in the past fell into this error; in reacting against the urban slums and poor conditions in many factories, they explicitly or implicitly made a comparison with preindustrial conditions indicating that the latter were much better. Urban slums and living conditions were all too frequently bad, but conditions in rural areas had been and continued to be as bad or worse. What urbanisation did was to concentrate the people and the problems and thus make them more visible than they were in rural areas. In fact, after the last great series of plagues and epidemics in the 1720s, mortality rates began to decline slowly but declined more quickly in the 19th C. The decline in mortality was one important cause of the population explosion.

- also, the transition from rural life to city life is enormous; migrants are separated from family and community, many suffer from the anonymity and the lack of social supports. Those in the city become more vulnerable to unemployment because they have nothing to fall back upon if they become unemployed. There are often heavy psychological costs and burdens; this kind of change and upheaval often produce high rates of alcoholism.

- however, it should be noted that some people enjoy urban life, even when living conditions are poor. They like the anonymity and the freedom from social ties and restraints of village life where everyone knows everyone and knows each other’s business; the city represents opportunities. Cities have long attracted people, even when conditions were unhealthy and dangerous. [Until about the middle of the 18th C, London always had higher mortality rates than birth rates ; the population was maintained and grew over several hundred years—London had long been the most populous city in Europe—only because of migration.]

- in fact, conditions were improving for many people. Consider the following examples:


- at the other extreme from industrialising Britain were Russia and much of eastern Europe which were overwhelmingly agrarian. This was true of southern Italy and much of Spain as well. Even parts of Germany (eastern areas especially) and France were little changed through much of the 19th C.

- in France, ownership of much of the land had been freed from the aristocrats and church during the French Revolution; thus there were large numbers of small-holders. This is sometimes given as a reason for the relative lack of progress in using machines and scientific methods to raise the intensity of production and to increase the levels of productivity.

- in England, it had been the large landowners who had taken the lead in innovating and making massive investments (better drainage and improving the soils):

- however, in eastern Europe, most of the agricultural land was owned by aristocratic landlords who made virtually no improvements. Many areas still relied on a 2 year or at best a 3 year fallow system which meant that one-third to one-half of agricultural land was lying fallow each year and not in crop production. Agriculture remained backward and productivity was low; few machines or other labour saving devices were used.

- as a result, the majority of the population was required to be engaged in primary agricultural production and surpluses were relatively small; it is the surplus which provides food for urban populations.

Eastern Europe as ‘breadbasket’

 - in the late 19th and early 20th C, eastern Europe and Russia were regarded as granaries and big exporters of grain. How can this be reconciled with my statements about the low productivity and low surpluses? There are a lot of misconceptions about this; these misconceptions were compounded in the wake of the 1st World War when many land distributions were made as large landowners’ holdings were broken up and distributed among small peasants. In the wake of this (economic disruptions such as inflation and depressions had effects too), there were drastic reductions in the amounts of food, especially grain, being exported from these regions compared to levels before the war.

- some economists claimed that this showed the ‘inefficiency’ of small holders compared to big holders’ productivity. Later research showed that most of this interpretation was false. The large export surpluses before 1914 were not due to greater ‘efficiency’ or higher productivity but rather to starvation of the working population. Before 1914 living standards were extremely low; malnutrition was widespread showing inadequate food intake.

- what happened after World War I was not a decline in productivity (it probably rose a bit or at least remained the same); instead, there was a significant increase in consumption by the producers and their families; also, growing cities in the area absorbed almost all surpluses leaving only small or no surpluses for export. (Stalin managed to export grain in the 1930s to help pay for needed imports of industrial goods in industrialisation, but we know that millions were starving to death at that time in the Soviet Union.)

The advance of industrialisation

 - by the beginning of the 20th C, the industrialisation process was well advanced in Britain and was advancing rapidly in other areas of northern and western Europe. Other areas had only limited or no beginnings of the process, but this ‘revolution’ would affect much of Europe during the 20th C.

- in evaluating the process, we need to strive for a balanced picture. Criticism of the process of industrialisation and those who superintended and directed the transformation (politicians and ruling classes) should not be based upon an idealised view of the past. Conditions for industrial workers and their families were often terrible, but conditions for workers before industrialisation were at least as bad and even worse. Nor should too much credence be placed on idealised or ideological views about how things should be done. Marx and Engels charged that capitalism ‘oozed blood from every pore’; however, industrialisation in China and the Soviet Union was directed by people claiming to be disciples of Marx and Engels, yet the process in those areas was also accompanied by very heavy costs to their peoples.

- such transformations are always difficult and involve heavy costs. Under laisser-faire capitalism in Britain, these costs were not distributed fairly, nor were the benefits shared equitably; there were great disparities.

- partly this is due to the nature of the transformation; in industrialisation large investments are required over 2 or 3 generations before increased production of consumer goods begins to allow greater consumption and therefore, higher standards of living. Thus, there is a strong tendency to be disparities between generations as the early generations endure low living standards as so much wealth is invested in productive facilities and infrastructure and later generations reap the payback of increased production of consumer goods.

- also, in subsequent industrialisations, more industrialised societies can and frequently have assisted societies just starting the process by helping to provide the initial investments. In Canada we have especially followed this path; we borrowed heavily from elsewhere during our industrialisation, and this made it possible for our standards of living to follow closely behind the U.S. This has the effect of spreading the economic costs over a longer period and asks later generations who benefit to also pay part of the cost by repaying the debts; it allows those in the early transition to enjoy higher standards of living than would otherwise be the case. Of course, it may also reduce somewhat the standards of living of later generations. In the early stages of industrialisation in Britain in the 18th C, bankers and investors from the Netherlands assisted in financing investments, but most was generated internally.


- nevertheless, truly dreadful conditions too often prevailed in Britain during industrialisation. Overcrowded housing with inadequate sewage and drinking water led to disease. Not only men but women and children worked incredibly long hours in mines and factories in very poor, often unsafe, conditions. Women and children in mines were said not to see the sun for months because it was not yet up when they went down into the mines and was already set when they came out again.

- critics did emerge and the beginnings of government intervention and regulation began: a minor Factory Act in 1802, although the 1st serious Factory Act only came in 1833; there was further legislation to restrict the hours and conditions of work for women and children in the 1840s.

- however, ideology was a serious barrier to most intervention—laisser-faire liberalism (we shall study this is detail later). Proponents of this ideology used exactly the same arguments as are used today by so-called ‘conservatives’ —Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Regan, Milton Friedman, or people from the Fraser Institute in Vancouver such as Michael Walker and Walter Block. They argued that gov’t should not interfere, that regulation is bad, and the ‘market’ should ‘free’ and unrestrained. The modern day proponents of ‘deregulation’ and the opponents of social and safety legislation in the 19th C are ideologically identical (both draw upon Adam Smith and the ideas of laisser-faire).

- ideas do have effects and consequences. Ideology prevented very much from being done to ameliorate the bad effects.

- also, even the relatively limited gov’t regulation in the 19th C was introduced and pushed through by conservatives in the face of vigorous opposition by laisser-faire liberals. As we shall see, these terms—‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’—meant very different things in the 19th C from what they do today. In fact, the terms tend to be used with different and even contradictory meanings even today.

- much of the effects of industrialisation tended to be hidden; as cities grew, different classes came to live in different areas and the well-off often did not see much of the real misery that existed. As we shall see later in the course, this began to change about the turn of the century. Social activists began to do ‘social surveys’ of conditions and incomes of people in the slums. In the Boer War and World War I, large numbers of men had to be rejected for military service because they were physically and intellectually unfit; a century of neglect and laisser-faire had produced stunted, deformed people. The evacuations of children to avoid bombing in both world wars showed middle class women how terrible were the conditions among many working class families in urban slums, especially in London.

- much of the political history of the 20th C in Britain and the creation of the welfare state is really based upon that legacy of neglect, unequal distribution of wealth and unequal distribution of the burdens of industrialisation. Creation of the welfare state was based upon the idea that these inequities were neither just nor good for society as a whole.


Political and social systems

- the variation in political systems showed a very similar pattern to that of economic development; i.e., there was a spectrum of ‘democratic’ systems in northern and western Europe to autocratic systems in eastern Europe.

‘Democratic’
 Britain

 - Britain was moving towards a modern system of representative democracy. In Britain (and France), the system was ‘responsible government’— one in which the government (i.e., the bureaucracy) was responsible (accountable or answerable) to the elected representatives of the voters. This is indirect accountability to the voters as opposed to the US system where the head of the government and bureaucracy—the president—is answerable directly to the voters and only partially accountable to the elected representatives in Congress.

- it is important to note that Britain was still only moving in the direction of full representative democracy at the beginning of the 20th C. Three reform acts in the 19th C had extended the vote or franchise to a growing percentage of the adult population but it was still a minority; women (over 50%) were excluded entirely and substantial numbers of males who were poor and/or had no property were also excluded. Women over 30 and the remaining men were given the vote in 1918. Universal, equal suffrage passed in Britain only in 1928 when women were finally given the same voting rights as men.

France

 - in France in the 19th C, ‘democracy’ fluctuated substantially as the country lurched from radical to conservative to liberal forms of government; the Third Republic, created in the 1870s after the Franco-Prussian War, was reasonably ‘liberal’ as far as male suffrage was concerned (broader than in Britain), but excluded women. [Opening the franchise to women began early in the 20th C first in Scandinavia, but did not happen generally until during or after World War I—Britain, Canada, the US. and others).]

Germany

 - Germany (i.e., the German Empire created by unification in 1870) was a compromise. There was an elected body in parliament with a franchise that was probably as broad as in Britain or more; however, the government (ministers and bureaucracy) was not responsible to parliament. This does not mean that the government could ignore parliament because it still had to get tax laws passed in parliament, but there were critical areas of the government’s actions which were not subject to scrutiny (military budgets, treaties and foreign relations, the military); these last were all considered part of the kaiser’s prerogative although in practice he followed his ministers’ advice.

Italy

 - Italy too was a ‘democracy’ in having representative government; however, with a multi-party system and with large numbers of deputies who were dedicated to helping themselves, most governments could use patronage and payoffs to maintain themselves and were not truly responsible (i.e., accountable to parliament).

Autocratic

 - most other areas, especially in central and eastern Europe were autocracies with the monarchs and their governments having no legal checks on their power and authority. This does not mean that these governments could do whatever they wanted; by the end of the 19th C, there was the emergence of ‘mass society’ everywhere in Europe and nervous governments recognised that ‘the people’ had to be reckoned with. It was recognised that it was foolhardy in the extreme to ignore ‘public opinion’. However, in Britain, ‘public opinion’ could make itself felt in elections and in a free press. In autocratic regimes, these means did not exist or, as in the case of the press, were not very free.

- the point is that in autocratic regimes ministers were chosen by the monarch (and by the ‘court’—the people around the monarch and royal family); this meant that they tended to be draw from a restricted pool of talent and from a limited social stratum (those socially acceptable to the monarch and the court). Manners and social connections often counted for more than ability or talent. It is true that in Britain too, the majority of ministers were from a limited social background; most were ‘gentlemen’ although that designation was very broad as compared to much more restricted social classes on the continent. Moreover, the degree of democracy and the demand that most ministers (especially the important ones) be drawn from the elected House of Commons meant that ministers required political talent; this did do a good deal of sorting out.

Classes

 - this brings us to the social structures (classes) and again, there was a spectrum ranging from Britain and France on one end to Russia and eastern Europe on the other.

- usually, the classes are categorised as upper, middle and lower classes, but that is not entirely useful as there were differences between urban and rural areas and between industrial and agrarian areas.

- in rural areas of unindustrialised societies of eastern Europe, there were the aristocratic large landowners at the upper end and peasants and agricultural labourers at the other. Unlike Britain and France, there were few small landowners. There were a limited number of ‘middle classes’ (estate agents, a few professional people in law, medicine, and education and so on); in most areas, aristocrats either controlled or had a large influence on local government (bureaucrats running the collection of taxes, policing, courts, etc.). As a result, these ‘middle classes’ were directly or indirectly employed by or were highly dependent on the will of the local aristocrats and had little real independence.

- in towns and cities, there was also a tiered hierarchical social system headed by a small, wealthy elite of bankers and merchants who were nonetheless included socially in the ‘middle classes’. However, there were a broad range of commercial and professional ‘middle classes’ including shopkeepers, lawyers, doctors, educators, artists, etc. At the bottom were the lower or working classes.

- the industrial revolution caused a massive expansion of all the urban classes; as Britain was most industrialised, its social system was most affected.

England

 - however, England had been different from the continent for a long time in regard to the relative fluidity (i.e., the amount of movement up or down the social hierarchy) of the social system. Under feudalism, the mass of the population had been unfree workers tied to the land—villains or serfs. In England, most had become free in the 13th and 14th Cs; they had been buying their freedom, but the Black Death had quickened the end because the labour shortages made it impossible to keep people from leaving. In any case, all English people had become ‘free’. With freedom, it was possible for lower class individuals to prosper and to move up into the middle classes; even a few became rich and some cases exist of individuals or of families over several generations acquiring estates and even titles.

[The last remnants of serfdom had been eliminated in France during the French revolution and Napoleon’s armies had brought freedom to other parts of Europe at the beginning of the 19th C. Prussia (especially in the east) ended serfdom in 1806. There was another burst of freedom in eastern Europe during the revolutions of 1848.

- however, serfs were not emancipated in Russia until a law in 1860; even then not too much changed for many peasants because farms being sold would list not only buildings, etc, but also how many peasants went with the land.]

 - England’s aristocracy was also more limited in numbers; by law, only males who had titles (at the beginning of the 18th century there were less than 200 but growing substantially after that). Sons, even heirs, were all legally commoners although they still shared the social status of their families. On the continent, all members of aristocratic families were considered aristocratic; over time, this produced large numbers of aristocrats, many of whom were impoverished.

- compared to the situation in much of the rest of Europe, there were few special privileges for aristocrats (one of the few privileges was that they could only be tried by their peers in the House of Lords, not the regular courts, but they were subject to the same laws as everyone else and if they were guilty of serious crimes, they were punished just like anyone else). Unlike the situation in many areas of Europe, there were no special exemptions from taxes or special legal codes.

- in England, there was another, much larger group of substantial landowners, known as the gentry. Many (baronets) had hereditary knighthoods but not titles and thus were commoners; they provided a large number of the representatives in the House of Commons. For many purposes, the gentry were part of the same class as aristocrats (the landed classes) and there was a considerable amount of intermarriage.

- a key point is to note is that in England there was always some movement between the landed classes and the wealthy commercial middle class. There was both upward and downward mobility:

- the long term political effects of this relative social fluidity were even more significant; the process of integration allowed for the adjustment of talent and status. The more able and competent could move up the social scale and the less competent sank or were forced to merge with the up and coming. There was some weeding out of the incompetent while some vigorous and talented new blood did get recruited into the dominant classes which did most of the governing.

- the on-going process of movement between the upper class of land-owning and wealthy commercial middle class was virtually unique in Europe; it went even further than already indicated. Younger sons of aristocrats had to be provided for (the landed estates were usually entailed to the oldest son); some younger sons could go into the army, the government or the church, but these were not sufficient to provide for all who needed a career. The result was a stream of younger sons into the professions (law and the church) and even into business (this last was virtually impossible in most parts of Europe; the shame and loss of prestige were simply too great for the family).

- in the industrial revolution, the problem of keeping wealth and social status in balance was greatly expanded; there were much greater opportunities for individuals (some of very humble origins—there were examples of working men who made inventions or started businesses) to become wealthy. What to do with the new ‘millionaires’?

‘Gentleman’

- in the 19th C the British devised new techniques of incorporation—especially, the use of ‘public schools’ and the concept of the ‘gentleman’.

- ‘public schools’ really became private schools, many of them residential; the sons of both the landowning classes and wealthy commercial, industrial, and professional middle classes were trained and educated together. They learned the same manners, the same accent and language, and the contacts which were often used for the rest of their lives. The products of these schools grew up to dominate government and empire and played important roles in the economy; the schools provided a ruling and governing class, but one which was relatively broadly based and drew from all the elites in the country.

- again the comparison is not with what we would consider ideal because the realities of class appear to us to be very rigid and unacceptable. However, in comparison with most other areas of Europe, the system was much more fluid and less rigid.

Lack of fluidity in Europe

 - the lack of this kind of adjustment meant that in Europe there were a number of problems that kept on growing. The aristocratic classes were over burdened with too many people who not only had nothing to do but who also were impoverished and had great difficulty in maintaining their social status. In the 18th C in France, the royal court at Versailles had been burdened with thousands of these impecunious aristocrats who were simply hangers-on looking for some appointment in the army or somewhere in the bureaucracy.

- on the other hand, there was a large, dissatisfied middle class who felt that their talents were not recognised while they were governed by incompetents whose only qualification might be that they were aristocratic.

- for example, in France before the revolution, the professional middle classes had little chance for upward social mobility and they became a major source of discontent. They were a big element in criticising the political and social situation, and they played a large role in the early stages of the French revolution. In other places, especially in Russia, educated, professional middle classes were also a source of discontent in the late 19th C.

- in eastern Europe where society was mostly agrarian, the lack of cities and manufacturing or even large amounts of trade meant that the commercial and industrial classes were small.

The intelligensia

 - another development should be noted. In the 18th C, ‘enlightened despotism’ had come very much into vogue as the best political system (we shall discuss the Enlightenment in greater depth a little later).

- the ‘enlightened despot’ was similar to Plato’s philosopher king, but was also based upon the Roman idea of the despotic emperor (i.e., a system where the emperor’s will is the law and laws were made by decree by the emperor without any check from elsewhere, such as the Senate in Rome or parliaments in modern Europe). However, the ‘enlightened despot’ should work for the benefit and improvement of all his/her subjects.

- in 18th C Europe, this meant rulers taking additional powers and expanding gov’t bureaucracies to implement policies and programmes.

- in the case of Russia, Peter the Great tried to force Russia to catch up with western Europe (France and Britain). The modernising programmes required larger numbers of better educated people to fill the bureaucracy. Universities were expanded and new ones built; philosophers and teachers were brought in from western Europe, especially France.

- however, the supply of graduates soon outran the demand as the state could only absorb so many in the education system and in the bureaucracy. This intellectual class or intelligentsia soon came to make up the bulk of the middle class in eastern Europe whereas in England, they tended to be counterbalanced by a large commercial middle class—they did not stand out as they did on the continent (also, in Britain, there were so many other job opportunities for educated men).

- the intelligentsia often formed a large reservoir of resentment. Jobs were scarce and they suffered a good deal of unemployment or under employment. Even the most able were limited in advancement opportunities. Government jobs at the top were mostly reserved for upper class men even though their education and talents were often much less.

- the ‘intellects’ were very critical of their societies. Their western-oriented educations gave them the values and standards of west European societies and rarely did their own societies measure up.

- the best example is Russia; Russia at the end of the 19th C was still the most ‘backward’ and least modern society in Europe. The novels of Dostoyevsky & others are filled with characters of this ‘intellect’ class, and it was this class which provided most of the personnel for the revolutionary groups such as the Bolsheviks, Social Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, etc.

- the great ambition of people in this class when their own ambitions were not realised was to secure an adequate education for their children in hopes that the latter might succeed; thus, the intelligentsia (the intellects) was self-perpetuating. So persistent is this that even today in Russia, after over 70 years of the Soviet Union and the ‘classless society’ and specific policies to try to obliterate it, most people there still are able to identify an individual’s family background: “He’s an intellect” or “He’s a peasant” even after a couple of generations of education.

- the intelligentsia were influenced by all the ideological traditions of western Europe; they became the major proponents of nationalism as well as other movements. As a result, they were in the forefront of the intellectual and political ferment with which the 19th C ended and the 20th C began.

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